Is Hinduism a religion, ‘of the Brahmins, for the Brahmins, and by the Brahmins’? I think this is the impression that one would get when reading the first eight pages of Introduction: A Brief History of Hinduism in the scholarly book by Manu S. Pillai, Gods, Guns, and Missionaries: The Making of the Modern Hindu Identity, Gurugram, Penguin Random House, 2024, pp. XIII to XXVIII. Of course, later in the rest of the introduction, he uses less of the Brahmin pickle for the Hindu khichdi that he cooked for others to savor. I wonder if an additional word—‘Brahmins’—in the title could serve this better, and I hope Manu would consider this request from a layperson who is also one of his fans: Brahmins, Gods, Guns, and Missionaries: The Making of the Modern Hindu Identity or, even better, Modern Hindu National Identity.
When I stumbled upon a YouTube video in which Manu Pillai gave an interview about his books and other readings, I was very much impressed by his scholarship and presentation with deep conviction. So I was longing to get one of his books to read. And when I got this book, I immediately started reading it, setting aside another book I was reading—Shashi Tharoor’s Why I Am a Hindu—to whom Manu also worked as a secretary. As I expected, he didn’t disappoint me, though I have not even completed the introduction.
But when I read the first part of the introduction, the one question that came to my mind was, ‘Is Hinduism created or invented by the Brahmins to serve their purpose—be it a “religious principle” or a national identity?’ However, as I read further, I realized that Manu’s target is not Brahmins but ‘Hindu Nationalism,’ which, according to him and many like him, ‘would catalyse Hindu nationalism’ (p. XXVIII) using Brahminical religious principles.
No one can disagree with Manu on all that he wrote about Brahmins, even claiming as if they ALONE ‘sculpted’ Hinduism. [‘ism’ in italics is original]. But as a layman and student of both Hinduism and history—though neither a scholar nor one who has received any academic discipline—based on other scholars’ information, my understanding was that, like so many other ‘isms,’ this ‘Hinduism’ was also created by the collaboration of Orientalists and British Indologists, of course, with the collaboration of pandits. However, their role in gathering the information—both positively and negatively—was not often recognized by the scholars who used their services by paying for them. Of course, as they have done throughout history and even now, they performed their work as a ‘profession,’ not expecting any credit, as they received their dakshina by selling their vidya.
However, being a Tamilian who has read many Tamil scriptures in the original—which also played a small role in shaping this ‘Hinduism’—I cannot find any such Brahminical Hinduism in its scriptures or literature, at least in its early formative stages (in Sangam literature).
Of course, there exists a pan-Indian Brahminical presence in every area of Indian life, though not a dominating one. They used every opportunity to push their superiority [or hegemony], mostly in theory, yet they too were used by others for their own purposes. At the same time, we have to recognize that, unlike any other caste group, which was brought under the broader varna system (‘Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra’), in spite of the differences regarding the identity of who is a Brahmin (p. XXV), there existed—and still exists—a pan-Indian Brahminical presence in every area of Indian life. This doesn’t mean that it was Brahmins who ‘sculpted’ Hinduism or that all Brahmins agree with Hindu nationalism, though its origin began with them. At the same time, no one can deny their role in shaping—rather than ‘sculpting’—a Hinduism that also contributed to the creation of Hindu nationalism.
After completing the first section (around eight pages), out of curiosity, I began to count how many times the word ‘Brahmins’ was used, as Manu almost punctuates every point with the word ‘Brahmin’ in this first section of the introduction. Though I quickly checked, I found around 70 words related to Brahmins, such as: Brahmins, Brahmin pandits, talent, ritualist, texts, promoters, elites, world, Brahmin-approved, descent, vision, feats, deities, ascendancy, vegetarian [so non-vegetarians], penetrated, denied, upgraded Brahmins, ideologies, equipped; Brahminical order, ideas, culture, stream; Brahminism, Brahminhood, etc.
As I already said, no one can disagree with what Manu wrote about Brahmins and their presence or influence on a pan-Indian level in shaping present-day Hinduism. But I wonder why a scholar like him is so obsessed with them when presenting the ‘Modern Hindu Identity,’ which is now more controlled and even hijacked by ‘Other than Brahmins’—I don’t even want to call them ‘non-Brahmins.’
As I have not even completed the introduction, it is too early to share my full views on this book as a layperson and student of Hinduism. However, I was a bit surprised when Manu referred to caste as a ‘religious principle’ and not also a ‘sociopolitical instrument’: ‘…While seemingly paradoxical, this mix and match had a logic: Even Buddhist royalty had an incentive in upholding Brahmin theories on caste, for example, viewed more as a sociopolitical instrument than as a religious principle’ (p. XXX). But later, when he writes about Virashaiva [Lingayats] in Karnataka, though he mentions Basava as its leading voice, who rejected extravagant Brahminical rites and mantras, he somehow didn’t mention that Basava himself was a Brahmin. So, if Brahmins played all kinds of roles in shaping present-day Hinduism, they also played the role of reformers, which most of the time is not recognized, as it does not serve one’s ideological purposes.
However, as a layperson who lives in a village with a dominant Lingayat presence, I see how even such Brahminical reforms to eliminate Brahminical ‘religious principles’ were not followed by several ‘Other than Brahmins,’ who became more Brahminical in upholding their respective caste identities than Brahmins themselves. As vast literature, scholarly papers, and books are available on this subject, I need not mention one. However, for better or worse, whether one likes it or not, even to write about ‘Modern Hindu Identity’—which aspires more for a secular identity, though never discarding its religious roots—one cannot escape this Brahminical mindset when writing about identity.
As a digression, and also an insider, let me say something about the Brahminical mindset, which does not belong exclusively to Brahmins. It wants only AUTHORITY but not POWER. It would happily hand over power to someone to stand in the front and take all the assaults on it, as we have noted and are still noticing throughout Indian history. Rarely would a Brahmin long to possess POWER but would never share the AUTHORITY that easily.
Let me give one modern example. I think it is Prof. Srinivasan, one of the leaders of BJP in Tamil Nadu. In one of his videos, he said something like this: “Let the Brahmins take the responsibility of guarding our dharma by doing their dharma as the spiritual leaders. They need not take that struggle, as some are ready to do so to defend against all the assaults against them. We will take care of it. Let them take care of our Dharma.” Of course, these are not his exact words but the summary of his talk, which I listened to. At present, I cannot give a reference to it. If time permits, I will hunt for it and provide it.
As I pointed out in another place [Sociology versus Theology], society came first, creating many ‘sociopolitical principles’ based on hierarchy for its smooth functioning. In general, priests often occupied the top place in the hierarchy, which, in several societies, was also occupied by kings assisted by or appointing priests for this purpose. [See Appendix on Priests] Then, sociology paved the way for mythology, creating Gods and ultimately using ‘religion,’ or rather ‘ritual,’ as an ‘instrument’ like theology to legitimize those ‘sociopolitical principles.’ Of course, as a ‘Brahmin-approved’ (p. XX) instrument, it was used by everyone to keep their place in that hierarchy, which never remained rigid. As Manu himself acknowledges: “In actual fact, though, this division [of caste] never existed in such perfection in most of India. It was an aspiration—the portrayal of an ideal Brahmin world—rather than reality as it existed”. [XVIII] Or now exists.
Regarding the ‘religious principle’ as more of a ‘sociopolitical’ one, Stock notes that ‘the religious culture on which these priesthoods are based originates prior to their ascendancy,’ which, according to my understanding, is more of a sociopolitical principle than a religious one: ‘One reason that priests oppose religious innovations is because their status rests on mastery of a relatively complex body of knowledge—especially rituals. Once learned, it is not lightly discarded in favor of something new. In addition, their education into the priesthood is steeped in the principle that there is a correct view or a right way to perform a ritual. Therefore, innovation is error. Thus, the religious culture on which these priesthoods are based originates prior to their ascendancy and then freezes…’— Rodney Stock, Discovering God, New York, HarperOne, 2007, p. 98
Finally, what Nirad C. Chaudhuri says about caste is worth quoting, of course, not targeting any scholar like Manu or others:
“…Taking the system as a whole, I would describe it as a social organization that contributes to order, stability, and regulation of competition, and I would close the digression with a piece of advice to the foreign reformers of Hindu society and their Hindu imitators: Please keep your tongues and pens off the caste system. If I could believe that the caste system was going to be destroyed in India by the palaver, I would have added: ‘Please do not pulverize a society that has no other force of cohesion into amorphous dust.’ But since there is no danger whatsoever to the caste system, I would only say: ‘Don’t make fools of yourselves.’”— Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe: An Essay on the Peoples of India, Jaico Publishing House, Mumbai (1966), Twelfth Jaico Impression: 1999, p. 58
Though I am tempted to quote much more scholarly information on caste, there is no need, as volumes of information are now available on the Internet. Still, I cannot resist giving a few more points from Chaudhuri in the appendix, but I excuse myself from quoting more scholarly sources:
“…It is difficult to see what the foundation for this alleged superiority is, other than an ingrained idea that Brahmanas must be superior because that is what everyone else seems to believe these days. In practice, superiority seems to attach to members of the landholding caste in both ritual and nonritual domains. If the Brahmana is hierarchically superior in an ideological sense, it is a Brahmana who is so idealized that he cannot possibly belong to the world of caste relations, where he would be tainted by the receipt of prestations for performing ritual services. It cannot be the Brahmana of the village, who is necessarily immersed in caste (i.e., interdependent) relations, and who is therefore, like everyone else, caught up in the web of inauspiciousness that is the product of the dealings of normal social life. Interestingly, Dumont’s theory predicts just this eventuality: ‘In theory, power is ultimately subordinate to priesthood, whereas in fact, priesthood submits to power.’”— Dumont, L. 1980 [1966], Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 71-72.— Vijay Nath, Puranas and Acculturation: A Historico-Anthropological Perspective, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 2001, p. 502.
Having said that, I am enjoying reading this book as it assures us the ability to grapple with the question of our identity as Indians in a secular democracy, where change and continuity often play a crucial role in shaping our identity. At the same time, anyone who wants to write or say anything about Indic Civilization, especially about Hinduism—whether Hindutva or Pseudo-Secularism—should keep one truth in mind: they can only state a HALF-TRUTH. Particularly when it comes to Hinduism, it always remains a MULTI-EDGED sword, not even having a handle to HANDLE it. When one attempts to handle it, he or she will likely bleed first before using it on others.
Conclusion
Manu Pillai’s Gods, Guns, and Missionaries presents an insightful yet Brahmin-focused narrative of Hindu identity, in the early part of the Introduction, raising critical questions about the role of Brahmins in shaping Hinduism. While his discussion of Brahminical influence is compelling, it seems to overemphasize their dominance in sculpting Hinduism, perhaps overlooking the contributions of other forces—colonial Orientalists, local traditions, and reformers. The book, however, does acknowledge the evolving nature of Hindu identity, which has been increasingly steered by ‘Other than Brahmins’ in modern political discourse. This paper attempts to engage with his arguments critically while recognizing the broader complexity of how Hinduism, as both a religion and a national identity, has been shaped.
Hyderabad, 4-3-2025
Appendix
On Priest
A second reason is that a privileged and closed priesthood tends to drift toward cynicism and unbelief. People wish to be priests because of the power and prestige of the priestly position, not primarily out of personal religiousness-indeed, in most of the ancient civilizations, including Sumer and Egypt, priests formed a hereditary class…..—— Rodney Stock, Discovering God, New York, HarperOne, 2007, p. 98
In Egypt, of course, it was Pharaoh Akhenaten who turned out to be a religious innovator and who imposed a strict form of monotheism. When he died a dozen years later, the deposed priesthood declared his vision to be “a heresy and Akhenaten was described as a criminal. His temples were demolished, his reign expunged from the records”{ Frankfort, Henri. ” Heresy in a Theocratic State.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 21 (1958):152-65, 152} as his successor dated his reign from the end of Akhenaten’s predecessor…..—ibid. pp. 98-99
On Caste
…It has been said that feudalism in Europe was an organization of the anarchy which followed the break-up of the Carolingian Empire. In India the caste system organized, not one kind of anarchy, but many. Hindu society did not attempt to suppress the immense range of racial, social, cultural, and economic diversities which history, was creating for it in unending succession. On the contrary, it accepted them, gave to each its place and niche, and brought into existence a living association of human groups of all sorts, which was a federation of its parts, without ever trying to be any one thing.– Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Continent of CIRCE; An Essay on the Peoples of India, Jaico Publishing House, Mumbai, (1966) Twelfth Jaico Impression:1999, p.54
…There was no other way in which they [Aryan] could preserve their ethnic, social, and cultural personality from being submerged in a conglomeration with the native Darks. They could no more countenance such a possibility than today Europeans in Africa can contemplate any submergence in the dark population. All human groups behave in this way when seriously faced with such a menace, and all develop a conviction of the sanctity of birth and blood. The Aryans in India carried the attitude to its logical extreme, the extreme demanded by the dangerous situation in which they were placed. So, they made heredity a principle of ordering, not only race relations, but all kinds of relation and functions, even the economic.—ibid. p. 55
…First of all, there is the charge that the caste system has been creating diversity and disunity. But the institution, as it has been worked through the ages, has never done so: it has only organized the disparities created by historical forces and movements. By so ding it has done great good by reducing the competition of the diversities, by freezing them within certain limits, and by making each not only legitimate but even moral. After assigning to each element of society its proper function or status, or rather recognizing the function and status it had arrived at through evolution, the Hindu social system made adherence to these a sacred duty…
For this reason the caste system may be described as a symbiosis in human life on the lines of the zoological. It canalized competitions and helped the co-existence of elements which otherwise would have been at war. It was a social system specially suited to a country like India, which history has made into a warehouse of civilizations, and a couloir and cul-de-sac of diverse peoples and cultures.—ibid. p. 56
…that it [Caste system] bars the way to talent, I (p.57) shall only quote an Englishman, who knew India at first hand, and was one of the greatest administrators the East India Company had. Writing about the caste system in his history of India he thought it necessary to set down the following:
The caste system has by no means so great an effect in obstructing the enterprise of individuals as European writers are apt to suppose. There is, indeed, scarcely any part of the world where changes of condition are so sudden and so striking as in India. the last Peshwa had, at different times, two prime ministers; one of them had been either an officiating priest or a singer in a temple (both degrading employments), and the other was a Sudra, and originally a running footman. the raja of Jeypur’s prime minister was a barber. The founder of the reigning family of Holcar was a goatherd; and that of Sindia a menial servant; both were Sudras. The great family of Rastia in Maratta country first followed the natural occupation of Brahmins, then became great bankers, and at length, military commanders. many similar instances of elevation might be quoted. The changes of professions in private life are no less observable.
So Mountstuart Elphinstone, and I could add to the list. It was always so in the whole history of the caste system. That it suppresses talent is a figment of the shallow egalitarian imagination.
The social immobility for which the caste system was made a scapegoat was really the product of the stagnation which was created in the social life of the Hindus by the Pax Britannica, and the suppression of talent laid at its door was almost wholly due to British rule. As the English military historian Kaye said in connexion with the military profession: ‘It was the inevitable tendency of our increasing power in India to oust the native functionary from his seat, or lift him out of his saddle so that the White man might fix himself there.’ This happened in most fields, and, above all, in public life, and the caste system was ready at hand to bear the blame.
If the system suppressed anything it was only ambition unrelated to ability…—ibid. pp. 56-57
…In an insightful study of the emergence of the ambalavasi (temple-dwelling) castes in Kerala, Kesavan Veluthat has shown that groups like the poduvals, the variyars, etc., did not enjoy the status of distinct castes during the ninth, the tenth and the eleventh centuries, when the Ceras of Mahodayapuram (ca. 844-1222) held sway over large parts of Kerala. These groups were recognized as so many brahmanas, carrying out secular functions related to the temple. In the course of time, they gained hereditary access to land by way of service tenures granted in lieu of periodic remuneration. Hereditary control over land consolidated their position within the temple and also as a closely-knit endogamous group, leading to their evolution as castes.{Veluthat, Kesavan, Brahman Settlements in Kerala: Historical Studies, revised and enlarged edition. Thrissur: Cosmo Books. 2013: 132-144} This is the most ingenious explanation to date for the emergence of castes in India before the institution underwent the great transformation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a result of the decennial census and the introduction of electoral politics.264….(p. 80) Thus, the nature of access to land is crucial for any discussion on caste in premodern India.— Manu V. Devadevan, A Prehistory of Hinduism, Berlin, De Gruyter Open Ltd, 2016, pp. 80-81
264 Cf. Talbot 2001: 48-86 (i.e., chapter 2) for a discussion in the context of Andhra, where it is argued that caste was amorphous and less frequently invoked. Stress is instead laid on ‘a typology of statuses’ (Ibid. 55-61). It may, however, be noted that many of these ‘status’ titles are now caste titles.—p. 80
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