When I read God’s Rivals: Why Has God Allowed Different Religions? by Gerald R. McDermott (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP Academic, 2007), I realized something striking: beyond the well-known theological Trinity, Christianity also presents what could be called a practical trinity—History, Heresy, and Satan.
While the theological Trinity is essential for understanding the Muktiveda, the practical Trinity is equally important for living out their life for Christians.
One may not fully grasp the theological Trinity, given its mysterious nature. However, without engaging with what might be called the Christian practical Trinity—History, Heresy, and Satan—one cannot truly understand not only Christianity, but the entire Abrahamic tradition.
While the term Asura in Hindu texts can be interpreted as a-sura (i.e., non-devas), the concept of a personal devil or Satan—especially as depicted in the Muktiveda—is a uniquely Abrahamic contribution. Of course, those who prefer comparisons might argue that asuras are equivalent to fallen angels, with Satan as their chief.
Interestingly, while the Muktiveda speaks of the fall of both angels and humans, in Hinduism, it is God Himself who “falls” when He contemplates creation—out of a fear of loneliness. This idea, though outside the scope of this paper, marks a significant difference between Hinduism and the Abrahamic faiths. Yet, one may observe a shared term—fall—in both.1
However, while one may internalize Satan as a symbol of the evil within us, as Mahatma Gandhiji has done [see below] the notion of Satan as a personal being who stands in opposition to God is absent in Hindu theology. One could even go further and say that, in Hinduism, God—or the gods, or Brahman—can exist without needing an adversarial counterpart. That, however, is inconceivable for the God of the Abrahamic faiths, particularly Christianity.
This does not mean that the concept of ‘evil’ is absent in Hinduism. It is very much there. But its origin is not attributed to an external figure like Satan. As Wendy Doniger observes,2 “The Indians are ‘strangely silent’ about the problem of evil, a problem that plagued Western but not Indian philosophy” (The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, p.3). She notes that when evil is addressed in Hindu texts, “it appears as a practical problem about evil,” particularly as “samsāra [the cycle of rebirth] is itself evil” (p.3). That is, the focus shifts from metaphysical opposition to a cyclical view of suffering.
Crucially, Doniger emphasizes that “a theodicy is necessary in any religion where any god is regarded as invariably benevolent and omnipotent,” and that this tension is more typical of monotheistic religions (pp.1–2). In contrast, many Hindu systems operate without the need to defend God against the existence of evil—because they do not begin with the premise that a single, all-powerful, all-good deity governs the cosmos.
Thus, the presence of evil in Hindu mythology is not seen in terms of a binary opposition—God versus Devil—but more as an intertwined reality. Evil is not treated as the enemy of good, but often as its counterpart within a unified cosmos.
This idea resists the either/or logic common in Abrahamic theology. It resembles instead a both/and approach—where light and darkness, good and bad, coexist and shape one another. As such, the Hindu worldview leans more toward a synthesis than an antithesis.
The either/or dichotomy—like “either God or devil,” or “either America or China,” as Donald Trump famously framed in his tariff war—forces a stark choice. One cannot serve both, just as the Tamil proverb goes: “pālukkuṁ kāval; pūnaikkuṁ tōzhan” (பாலுக்கும் காவல்; பூனைக்கும் தோழன்)—you cannot guard the milk and befriend the cat. Perhaps, as a Christian, Trump too is influenced by this dichotomous vision. But when it comes to Hinduism, both/and is a lived reality. Darkness is needed for light to be seen; evil gives meaning to good. These opposites, not as moral enemies but as existential companions, make life a synthesis.
The same applies to heresy. In Christianity, heresy has been foundational—not only theologically but also historically and culturally. But in Hinduism, as Shashi Tharoor rightly points out, the idea of heresy simply doesn’t exist:
“Hinduism is also a faith that uniquely does not have any notion of heresy in it: you cannot be a Hindu heretic because there is no standard set of dogmas from which you can deviate that make you a heretic. Indeed, not even what one might think of as the most basic tenet of any religion—a belief in the existence of God—is a pre-requisite in Hinduism.”3
As for history, again, the difference is profound. While Hinduism certainly has its sacred narratives and epics—like the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata—the Abrahamic faiths, especially Christianity, are rooted in a very particular understanding of history as a linear and divinely directed process. In Christianity, this is most vividly expressed in the Incarnation: God becoming man in the person of Jesus Christ, at a specific moment in historical time.
This divergence has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Arvind Sharma, in his seminal work Hinduism and Its Sense of History, 4 explains this distinction with clarity and insight. He writes:
“The role which history plays in the Western religions is played by philosophy in India” (p. 3).
Sharma elaborates that Indian tradition has often prioritized eternal truths over historical contingencies, leading to a certain indifference toward the historical dimension:
“The traditional Hindu was more interested in the transcendental truth than in historical fact”(p. 4).
Even when historical events were recorded, they were mythologized or treated cyclically rather than linearly. By contrast, Sharma notes that Christianity regards history as the medium through which divine salvation unfolds:
“Christianity is rooted in historical events and its theology is inseparable from them. Hinduism, by contrast, sees truth as timeless” (p. 5).
To be fair, within certain Hindu traditions like Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, one does find a notion of divine intervention in history, especially through the doctrine of avatāra (divine descents). But even here, the nature of intervention is cyclical and repetitive, not singular and final as in Christianity.
This is why, as Sharma points out, Hinduism lacks a “sense of history” in the same theological register:
“The Indian religious traditions… are more interested in ‘perennial philosophy’ than in ‘salvation history’” (p. 7).
Thus, Christianity operates with a historical consciousness in which time has a direction and goal—a beginning, a middle, and an end—while Hinduism moves within the rhythms of cyclical time and the eternal return. This fundamental difference is not merely a matter of narrative preference; it reflects two entirely different worldviews about the nature of time, reality, and the divine.
In summary, while one may be a Christian without fully understanding the theological Trinity, one cannot fully remain a Christian without engaging with this Christian Trinity of History, Heresy, and Satan. These are not just theological ideas—they are essential to the structure and self-understanding of the Christian faith. And while comparative theology is both fascinating and fruitful, what Gandhi attempted—abstracting the Christian Satan into a symbolic moral force within Hinduism—misses the full existential and theological weight of what Satan signifies in the Abrahamic tradition.
This reflection naturally leads us to consider Mahatma Gandhi’s own response on the topic. True to his philosophical method, Gandhi often reinterpreted religious figures and doctrines as internalized, moral principles. For instance, he viewed ahimsa in the Mahabharata not as a principle behind actual or mythological warfare at Kurukshetra, but as an allegory for inner spiritual conflict. Similarly, when questioned by S. D. Nadkarni about his use of the term “Satan,” Gandhi responded by interpreting Satan not as a literal being, but as a symbol of the moral and spiritual challenges within human nature. He suggested that Hinduism, with its own mythological figures like Ravana and the Asuras, could accommodate such a concept, even if under different names and frameworks.
In Young India (17-9-1925), Nadkarni challenged Gandhi’s use of “Satan,” arguing that it was un-Hindu, as Hinduism attributes evil not to a personal tempter but to internal passions such as lust, anger, and greed. Gandhi replied that he did not believe in a literal Satan any more than in a literal ten-headed Ravana. Instead, he defended the symbolic and poetic value of personifying evil. In his view, Hinduism, in its all-embracing inclusiveness, could contain such representations just as it contains innumerable personifications of virtue and vice. This exchange offers valuable insight into Gandhi’s interreligious thought, which is given in full in the Appendix for further reflection. For further reading see:
Ashram, 20-4-2025
Notes
- It will be seen that no real distinction can be drawn in principle between the Fall of God and that of Man: both are the necessary consequences of a divine nature common to both. The sin and shame, the virtue and glory of existence are his as much as ours.16 The difference between us is that he knowingly remains within at the same time that he comes forth Self-ishly, while we are conscious only in our ‘self’. He is a tide at once fontal and inflowing: we are its waves, oblivious that wave is water too. Our only error is to see distinction here: the Comprehensor, ya evam vidvaan, knowing himself no more as wave, but as the sea him-Self, has ever really—but only logically—left.
16— Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, I.2 (= Satapatha Brahmana X.6.5), quoted in Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Perception of the Vedas, edited by Vidya Nivas Misra, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi: Manohar, 2000, p. 33. Or, as expressed by Jili, while religion (dualism) distinguishes ice (the universe) from water (God), understanding (monism) realizes their identity (Nicholson, Studies…, p. 99).
—ibid., p. 33. (Note: No reference provided for Nicholson—db)
From the Christian point of view, the fallen Angels are “fallen in grace, but not in nature.”
—ibid., The Darker Side of Dawn, p. 193.
2 Theodicy, the term used to designate the problem of evil and its attempted resolution, is derived from the Greek theos, god, and kike , justice; it was put into general currency by Leibniz {Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Essai de Theodicee (Amsterdam, 1710), who used it to signify the defense of the justice of God in face of the fact of evil.— Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology, University of California Press, Berkeley. Paperback Edition, (1976) 1980, p.1
It might appear that theodicy is a problem only in religions which presuppose a single, benevolent, omnipotent god. If this were so, the problem of evil might be solved if one were to accept any of three alternative to benevolent monotheism: “Either there is no spirit behind the universe, or else a spirit indifferent to good and evil, or else an evil spirit.” {Lewis, Cs. The Problem of Pain. London, 1957, p.14} (p.1)…. Logically, a theodicy is necessary in any religion where any god is regarded as invariably benevolent and omnipotent, though typically it arises in monotheistic religions.( Obeyesekere, Gananath, “Theodicy, Sin and Salvation in a Sociology of Buddhism.” In Leach, Edmund R. (ed.), Dialetic in Practical Religion, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology, no. 5, pp. 7-40, Cambridge, 1968, p.9)….—ibid. pp.1-2
…the Indians are “strangely silent” about the problem of evil, a problem that plagued Western but not Indian philosophy: [Herman, Arthur Ludwin, The Problem of Evil and Indian Thought, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, Published by Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1976, pp. i and ii] “Classical and medieval Indian philosophy (p.3) has not shown any great concern for the problem of evil in any of its theological forms …When a problem of evil appears, consequently, it appears as a practical problem about evil, i.e. one states that all is suffering, samsaara [the cycle of rebirth] is itself evil…. When the problem of evil itself is discussed in the older texts it is almost as an aside, or it appears secondarily in the context of Who made the world?” [ibid., p. 415 and p.2] this “strange silence” he [Herman] attributes largely to the satisfactory nature of the solution provided by the doctrine of rebirth….—ibid. pp. 3-4
The belief that Indians did not recognize the problem of evil is widespread. “For Hindu thought there is no Problem of Evil.” Writes Alan Watts [Watts, Alan, The Way of Zen, New York, 1957, p. 35] and a Hindu scholar concurs: “Hinduism is not puzzled by the Problem of Evil.” [Buch, Maganlala A. The Principles of Hindu Ethics, Baroda, 1921p.9] Similarly, it is often said that there is no concept of evil at all in India…. Statements of this kind are generally based on Vedaantic Hinduism and Buddhism, which are concerned more with ignorance than with sin, valuing virtue only as an adjunct to knowledge, by means of which the philosophic saint rises above both good and evil; and many varieties of Indian religion regard suffering rather than sin as the fault in the world. {Eliade, Mircea, “Notes de Demonologie.” Zalmoxis 1,1938:1-67, pp. 202ff., and (1965), p.96} These beliefs do not, however, apply to most of Puraanic Hinduism.—ibid. p. 4
3 Shashi Tharoor, Why I Am a Hindu (New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2019), p. 9
4 Arvind Sharma, Hinduism and Its Sense of History, New Delhi, Oxford, 2003:
…We are now able to perceive a degree of correspondence between Visistadvatic theology and Christian theology at the level of fundamental philosophical categorization { God, Man, and Nature}.
Christian theology in particular and the whole Judeo-Christian tradition in general, however, does not stop here-it has a fourth key category which it calls history. And then one is told that this is what sets the Western religions of Judaism and Christianity apart from Hinduism. It was pointed out earlier, however, that this theological notion of history involves the intervention of God in such a way as to affect the destiny of man. And Hinduism, we have been repeatedly told, has no such sense of history.
…In Judaism, God’s intervention is personal, in the sense that God is personally involved in the fate of his people; it is not personal in the sense that God himself personally descends among them. 63 In Christianity, however, God is incarnated as man-as full man (and full God). 64 But such an incarnation occurred only once-this is where a difference emerges on the question of God’s incarnatory intervention in history within Christianity and Hinduism.65
It is clear, therefore, that at least in the form of Hinduism represented by Śrī Vaisnavism there is a clear concept of God’s intervention in history. To be sure it is not identical with that in Christianity. 66 But while they may not be twins, can there be any doubt that they belong to the same family?—p. 72 [Vaishnava, Incarnation, history]
63. This is an interesting point of comparison between Judaism and Śaivism as “Siva is not said to have incarnated himself like Vişnu. But nevertheless he comes to the aid of man, appears in flesh and blood in different capacities to alleviate human misery (T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Limited, 1971, p. 36). Perhaps God appears in Saivism more often than in Judaism but a similarity in the unwillingness to incarnate should be noted.
64. See Mircea Eliade, editor in chief. The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), Vol. 14, p. 103.
65. K. M. Sen, Hinduism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961), p. 73, note 1.
66. It is worth noting that Christianity accepts the doctrine of incarnation notwithstanding the theological difficulties such a belief entailed, see Willard G. Oxtoby, The Christian Tradition’, in Willard G. Oxtoby, World Religions: Western Traditions (second edition) (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 227ff.
Appendix:
108 IS THERE SATAN IN HINDUISM?
A correspondent writes:
A few months back under a heading not quite justified by its contents you published a letter of mine concerning certain religious systems and the belief in God. 1 Now I am tempted to put you a question concerning his adversary (according to Semitic beliefs), whose name you
are so often using in your writings and speeches — not of course without effect, as witness the article “Snares of Satan” in your issue of 6-8-’25. If it was only rhetorical effect that was intended thereby, because you were writing or speaking in the language of a people who have been taught to believe in Satan’s existence through the Semitic creed of Christianity, then I would have nothing to say. But the article cited, among other things, does seem to point to a belief on your part in Satan’s existence, — a belief, in my humble opinion, quite un-Hindu. Asked by Arjuna what was the cause of man’s continual fall, Sri Krishna said: “ Kama esha, krodha esha”, etc. (“It is lust, it is anger” — ). According to Hindu belief, it would seem, the Tempter is no person outside of us, nor indeed is it one ; for there are ‘the six enemies’ of man enumerated in the Shastras:
kama or lust, krodha or anger, lobha or greed, moha or infatuation, mada or
pride, and matsara, i.e., envy or jealousy.
So it is clear, Hinduism has no place for Satan, the Fallen Angel, the Tempter, or as he has been called by a French writer (Anatole France), ‘God’s man-of-affairs’! How is it then that you who are a Hindu speak and write as if you believed in the real existence of the Old One?
Mahatmaji’s response:
This correspondent { S. D. Nadkarni} is well known to the readers of Young India. He is too wide awake not to know the sense in which I could use the word Satan. But I have observed in him a disposition to draw me out on many matters about which there is a likelihood of the slightest misunderstanding or about which a greater elucidation may be considered necessary. In my opinion the beauty of Hinduism lies in its all-embracing inclusiveness. What the divine author of the Mahabharata said of his great creation is equally true of Hinduism. What of substance is contained in any other religion is always to be found in Hinduism. And what is not contained in it is insubstantial or unnecessary. I do believe that there is room for Satan in Hinduism. The Biblical conception (p. 195) is neither new nor original. Satan is not a personality even in the Bible. Or he is as much a personality in the Bible as Ravana or the whole brood of the Asuras is in Hinduism. I no more believe in a historical Ravana with ten heads and twenty arms than in a historical Satan. And even as Satan and his companions are fallen angels, so are Ravana and his companions fallen angels or call them gods, if you will. If it be a crime to clothe evil passions and ennobling thoughts in personalities, it is a crime for which perhaps Hinduism is the most responsible. For are not the six passions referred to by my correspondent, and nameless others, embodied in Hinduism ? Who or what is Dhritarashtra and his hundred sons? To the end of time imagination, that is, poetry, will play a useful and necessary part in the human evolution. We shall continue to talk of passions as if they were persons. Do they not torment us as much as evil persons? Therefore, as in innumerable other things, in the matter under notice the letter killeth, the spirit giveth life.
–Young India, 17-9-1925, CWMG, Vol. 28, pp. 195-196
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