No religion advocates or promotes violence, particularly in the name of faith. Yet, historically and in the present, nearly all religions have engaged in some form of violence—whether for political, social, ideological, or ritual purposes. Likewise, no religion advocates or promotes “terrorism” based on its theology. However, there may be one exception to this, which is interpreted in various ways. Here, I don’t need to delve into textual, historical, or current events to specify which religion this may be. While we cannot hold every follower responsible, a general perception persists, however misguided it might be. Selectively quoting either from texts or history to highlight tolerance does not fundamentally alter this generational perception.
Similarly, an Indian who values secular democracy and keeps faith a personal matter may still disagree with Amartya Sen’s critique of the Sangh Parivar. Sen views its agenda as divisive, arguing it fosters societal friction to promote Hindutva. My disagreement, however, is less with the critique itself and more with Sen’s selective interpretation of Indian history, both past and present, which can create confusion.
Historians must balance their interpretations carefully. Relying entirely on written evidence to construct collective consciousness can be misleading if that evidence is not subjected to critical scrutiny.1 As Chattopadhyaya warns, the burden of current societal issues cannot simply be ascribed to the past without careful analysis. History, he notes, is often constructed with reference to the present, yet this construction must avoid aligning the past exclusively with contemporary viewpoints.2
For example, we should acknowledge the Islamic influence on Indian civilization, suggesting it was broadly tolerated by Hindus, with occasional instances of mutual benefit.3 There is enough evidence for Hindu kings allotting land for mosques and demonstrating instances of interfaith support.4 However, this tolerance was not one-sided; historical records also reveal instances of both Hindus and Muslims showing magnanimity toward each other, and even today, instances of mutual participation in religious events are common.5 But to view Islamic rule as entirely tolerant overlooks the reality that political dominance, rather than genuine tolerance, was often a priority—except in notable cases like Akbar and Dara Shikoh (the latter being executed by his brother Aurangzeb).
Sen points to the rebellion of Akbar, one of Aurangzeb’s sons, as an instance where he allied with Hindu king Raja Sambhaji, the son of Shivaji, against his father.6 Sen suggests this rebellion demonstrates that even Aurangzeb’s close circle resisted his intolerance. But was Akbar’s rebellion truly about opposing intolerance, or was it motivated by a political ambition to seize the throne? To support his argument, Sen seems to overlook the complex motivations behind royal conflicts, which often had more to do with political power than with religious ideology.
From a scholar of Sen’s stature, an impartial assessment of history would be expected. Selective interpretations that serve a particular narrative risk promoting biased views. Chattopadhyaya cautions against historians imposing their perceptions onto the source material. He argues for a continuous revisiting of sources with a measure of mistrust, as historians’ selections often shape which elements of history become visible to the public.7 Such an approach would enrich historical discourse by allowing multiple perspectives to enter the narrative.
When Sen wrote this in 2005, it was shortly after the BJP lost the 2004 parliamentary election, partly attributed to post-Babri Masjid violence in Gujarat, for which then-Chief Minister Modi was blamed by critics, including Sen. In his analysis, Sen identified BJP’s ‘soft Hindutva’, focusing on developmental issues with a slogan ‘India shining’, strategy as a factor in its defeat.8 However, the situation has evolved, with Modi now serving his third term as Prime Minister.
Here’s an edited version of your paragraph for clarity and flow:
The politicization of religion in India is not exclusive to the Sangh Parivar or the BJP. This trend began long before these groups entered the political arena. As Sen observes, “even when enthusiasts for religious politics in India have succeeded in emphasizing religious differences, they have primarily done so by generating societal frictions, using demographic aspects of religion to isolate communities for selective targeting—as seen to a significant extent in Gujarat in 2002.” However, religion’s involvement in Indian politics predates the BJP’s rise, with earlier examples from the Congress, including the Shah Bano case and the shilanyas in Ayodhya,9 demonstrating how various parties have leveraged communalism for political gain.
When I picked up Sen’s book, I anticipated a fresh perspective on the subject. However, while his arguments are insightful, they largely reiterate familiar rhetoric without offering substantial new viewpoints. I had expected a work that transcends a narrow narrative to explore historical and political issues more broadly. I was particularly surprised by Sen’s repeated comparisons between China and India on issues like health and economics, devoting an entire chapter, “China and India” [pp. 161-190], to the topic and frequently revisiting it throughout the book. While comparing countries can yield valuable insights, it’s essential to recognize that each nation’s unique history and circumstances often make direct comparisons challenging. Sen’s views, written in 2005 when “China was shining,” invite curiosity about his current stance, especially on economic comparisons between India and China.
Returning to the theme of this article, Sudhir Kakar’s approach provides a more nuanced understanding of communal tensions. In Conflict: Hindus and Muslims,11 Kakar explores how a Hindu’s self-identification often emerges in relation to the presence of a Muslim, while Muslims do not necessarily rely on Hindus to affirm their identity. This dynamic underscores the complex nature of Hindu-Muslim interactions, as Kakar observes that “a Hindu is born only when the Muslim enters the scene.” 12 This differentiation in self-perception is critical for understanding communal dynamics.
In a discussion with my brother-in-law, he observed that while individual Muslims may exhibit high personal ethics, communal dynamics can sometimes foster a collective identity that can clash with the broader society. My sister added that religious harmony is unlikely as long as Muslims prioritize Islam as their primary identity, questioning why Hindus are often denied a similar communal identity under secularism.
Bhattacharya, through historical analysis, indicates that Muslims were once seen as “social outsiders” 13—rather than as a communal ‘Other’14—a division largely cultivated under British rule.15 Political exploitation of these divisions has perpetuated communalism in post-independence India. Kakar proposes multiculturalism as a more viable alternative to a ‘composite’ culture, suggesting that mutual respect for religious differences can foster a public realm of common understanding without demanding unrealistic unity. He suggests that “we may have to give up Gandhi’s dream of ‘lasting heart unity’ and instead adopt a stance of ‘benign difference’” (Kakar, Conflict: Hindus and Muslims).16
In summary, while historical and cultural differences undeniably shape modern India, scholars should maintain a balanced perspective, especially when discussing topics as sensitive as communal harmony and political motivations. Only through careful, non-partisan scholarship can we aspire to a society that respects its diverse identities while fostering genuine tolerance.
Chennai, 18-10-2024, Revised on 5-11-2024 at Gurukulam
Notes
1. …attempts to construct collective consciousnesses of the past by placing absolute trust in written evidence, which upon inspection, may be found susceptible to equivocation. History, one has to admit, is constructed with reference to the present, but it can be done by sparing the past an identity or proximity to a single strand in our contemporary consciousness. The past, simply as past, is a historical notion; the burden of our current malaise therefore cannot be conveniently attributed to any past, in any way we choose.—Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya, Representing The Other: Sanskrit Sources and the Muslims, Eighth to Fourteenth Century, pp. ix-x, Preface. [No further publishing information is available in this book—db].
2. …historians often tend to “use historical narrations almost exclusively as unstructured, uninterpretive mines of factual information” and are usually “content to ask what information the source provides that (p. 61) can be useful for solving their own problems.” I argue that in the process of historical reconstruction, we tend to convert a single representation into an absolute empirical reality without instituting comparisons. This, it must be underlined, is as likely a slip in other sources as it is in Sanskrit sources.—pp. ix-x, Preface pp. 61-62.
27 Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “Towards a Mode of Criticism for Premodern Islamicate Historical Narratives,” in Toward a Theory of Historical Narrative: A Case Study in Perso-Islamicate Historiography, ed. M. R. Waldman, Columbus, 1980, pp. 3-4, c=Chap. 1.
3. Jagadu-carita (Bühler, Jaguducharita) makes special mention of two benefactions of Jagadu (the famed merchant of Sola Kula). One was the massive relief he provided during a terrible famine afflicting the entire country.
Jagadu’s other acts of generosity were mostly in the form of patronage to Jaina religious shrines but also included constructing a masīti (mosque) called Shimāli, likely from “Ism’ali” (the most high name).—Bühler, Jaguducharita@, p. 18.
When Jagadu’s devout life ended, news of his death caused sadness everywhere. Nearby princes mourned; the Delhi king (Garjanesa) removed his turban in respect, Arjuna wept loudly, and the king of Sindh abstained from food for two days.—ibid., p. 41.
@ (Jaguducharita or Jagaducharita by Georg Bühler, a historical romance from Gujarat written by Sarvananda, was published in Vienna as part of Bühler’s Indian Studies series in 1892 by the Imperial Academy of Sciences.)—AI access, 5-11-2024, 10:40 am.
4. Two notable references discuss instances of Hindu rulers granting land for mosque construction in Kerala and Gujarat, highlighting India’s history of religious inclusivity.
In Kerala, the Palaiya Jumma Palli mosque in Kilakarai, built with local Hindu kings’ support in the 7th century, exemplifies early Hindu-Muslim harmony. For further details, see R. Michael Feener’s Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives (2004, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA) and Kerala archives.
In Gujarat, André Wink’s Al-Hind: The Making of the Indo-Islamic World (1990, E.J. Brill, Leiden) provides insights into Hindu elites supporting Islamic structures as Gujarat became an Indo-Islamic cultural hub.—AI access, 5-1-2025, 8:10 pm.
5. Even now in Tamilnadu, the Muslims will pay all the cost of expenditure and even carrying the plaki when the deity from Sri Mushnam, Bhuvarakap Perumal Temple, visit the sea shore for the ‘Theertha vari’ in Parangippettai near Chidembaram. Similar mutual participation of common in South India.
6. Aurangzeb’s son, also named Akbar, rebelled against his father in 1681, allying with Hindu Rajput kings to fight him. As the Rajputs were defeated, Aurangzeb’s son continued resisting by joining another Hindu king, Raja Sambhaji, Shivaji’s son.—Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History, and Identity, New Delhi, Penguin Books, 2005, p. 61.
7. No study can exhaust all sources related to the problem under investigation, but historians’ perceptions, rather than sources themselves, often guide selection and interpretation. Thus, any critique of generalizations demands reading similar source materials with skepticism and new perspectives, which may reveal overlooked sources. [p. 6]
Revisiting sources continuously is essential, as no source can be deemed conclusively representative. The historian’s selective interpretation often obscures much from history’s audience. This selective visibility makes it crucial for other voices to intervene.—Chattopadhyaya, p. 7.
8 Sen, op. cit. p. 70
9 Sen, ibid. p. 70
10. The Congress (I) government appeared less rigid in its secularist stance; it acquiesced to orthodox Muslim opinion on the Shah Bano case, allowed the unsealing of the disputed structure in Ayodhya, and permitted the shilanyas ceremony. This shift emboldened Hindu nationalist discourse, with the BJP forming a coalition against Congress (I), creating conditions conducive for a “mixed strategy” involving Ramjanmabhoomi symbolism.—Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics 1925 to the 1990s, Penguin Books, 1999, p. 527.
11. Sudhir Kakar & Katharina Kakar, Indians: Portrait of a People, New Delhi, Penguin Books, [2007], 2009, pp. 152-177.
12. Generally, a Hindu’s self-identity as Hindu emerges only in the context of Muslims; otherwise, identity is often caste-based. Hindus define themselves in relation to Muslims, while Muslims do not require Hindus for self-awareness. The presence of Hindus may heighten Muslims’ religious identity but does not constitute it.—ibid., p. 157.
13. The construction of “the other” is neither religious nor territorial; though dharma means religion, Muslims are not depicted as a community with antithetical religious practices. The terms Mleccha, Yavana, or Turuska refer to Muslims as social outsiders, reinforcing the Brahmanical notion of societal order threatened by “others.”—Chattopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
14. If sources depict communities viewed as “others” by their authors, we must acknowledge our own “otherness” as interpreters. This field involves multiple agents—the represented, the representer, and the interpreter(s)—which resists simplistic, unilinear interpretations.—ibid., p. 54.
15. The term “divide and rule” is well-known and requires no scholarly citation. However, Gandhi attributed Hindu-Muslim discord to British influence, and Mohammed Ali later cited it as, “We divide, and you rule.”—Ansar Hussain Khan, The Rediscovery of India: A New Subcontinent, Orient Longman Limited, 1995, p. 171.
Reginald Coupland, Indian Politics, 1936-1942: Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part I, Oxford University Press, 1943, pp. 35-36.
16. We are moving towards recognizing Hindu-Muslim distinctions rather than pursuing their illusory unity. A multicultural society, rather than a composite one, allows each religious group to engage modernity actively rather than passively endure it. We may have to abandon Gandhi’s dream of “lasting heart unity” and instead foster a public realm that respects each community’s “benign difference.”—Kakar, op. cit., p. 179.
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