Justice, Morality, and the Limits of Rational Ideals: A Comparative Reflection

By Dayanand Bharati

Introduction

Discussions on justice and morality often attempt to operate on fixed rational ideals. But when abstract principles confront real-life dilemmas—especially across cultures—their limitations become evident. This reflection, based on a well-known moral case study and enriched by Indian perspectives on dharma, explores the tension between universal ideals and contextual ethics.

I. Justice in the Western Imagination

What is justice? What makes an action morally justifiable? Can morality be determined by logic, or does it always carry the burden of context, culture, and consequence? These questions have troubled philosophers across traditions and centuries.

In a recent lecture series by Professor Michael Sandel of Harvard University (Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?),1 I found myself revisiting these dilemmas. Sandel uses legal cases and thought experiments to explore justice through competing frameworks such as:

• Utilitarianism (Consequentialism): The morally right action produces the greatest good for the greatest number.
• Kantian Ethics (Deontology): Certain actions are morally wrong regardless of their consequences.

II. The Lifeboat Case: Rational Systems in Crisis

A key example from Sandel’s course is the real-life “Lifeboat Case” (Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 1884). Three shipwrecked sailors kill and eat a young orphan, Richard Parker, to survive. The court later debates the moral and legal validity of this act.

The sailors argued:

• Parker was weakest and had no dependents.
• Their own survival would preserve more social value.

Public sympathy leaned in their favor based on utilitarian logic. But deeper questions arise:

• Should social ties determine the value of a life?
• Can one consent to their death while already mentally and physically compromised?
• Are choices made under fear and hunger truly “conscious”?

These raise doubts about whether either rigid moral laws or purely relative ethics can address such dilemmas. There is always a gray zone. This is where Indian ethical traditions offer a distinctive lens.

III. The Indian Ethical Framework: Dharma and Contextual Wisdom

Unlike the Western search for universal principles, Indian traditions approach morality as dharma—a dynamic, context-sensitive concept shaped by:

• Deśa (place)
• Kāla (time)
• Nimitta / Vartamāna (motive / present context)

This leads to a morality that is:

• Conscience-guided
• Situationally interpreted
• Not absolute, yet not arbitrary

Even if śruti, smṛti, and other authoritative texts are available, an individual might remain morally confused—as seen with Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita. Hence, Hindu tradition often advised deference to wise elders or local customs. The Mahābhārata itself acknowledges:

tarko’pratiṣṭhaḥ śrutayo vibhinnāḥ
naiko ṛṣir yasya vacaḥ pramāṇam
dharmasya tattvaṁ nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ
mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ

(Logic is unreliable, scriptures are contradictory, no sage’s words are definitive; the truth of dharma lies hidden in a cave. Follow the path trodden by the great.)2

IV. Dharma in Action: Texts and Traditions

Indian tradition does not claim moral perfection but strives for balance in a world of disorder. Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata, recognized that:

• People may fail to follow dharma
• Ethical conflicts are inevitable
• Yet dharma remains the sustaining force of life

This makes Indian ethics layered, practical, and compassionate—without being relativistic.

As D. Badrinath observed:

“The dharmic quest was more for completeness than for perfection… Indian history has been one of fragmentation and attempts to unify diverse contexts under dharma.”3

However, critics like B. Khan have warned:

“The Hindu dharma became a closed system of thought; self-criticism or free thinking was denounced… It produced mentally dwarf and morally too ill a nation…”4

Such critiques underscore the danger of rigid traditionalism. But the original dharmic vision always aimed for moral discernment—not blind rule-following.

V. Ethical Ambiguity in Indian Thought: Matilal and Beyond

Philosopher Bimal Krishna Matilal helps illuminate how Indian epics, especially the Mahābhārata, operate within moral ambiguity rather than clear-cut binaries. In Krishna: In Defence of a Devious Divinity, Matilal argues:

• Krishna’s morally ambiguous actions (like deception) are not failures, but necessary adaptations in service of dharma.
• Indian ethics acknowledges that moral action often requires navigating conflict, context, and conscience.

“Indian ethics, unlike Kantian deontology, understands that moral reasoning is lived—not mechanically applied.”⁵

VI. Conscience and Compassion: Everyday Encounters

This pragmatism came home to me in a personal conversation. When asked, “What is the greatest virtue?” I reflexively replied, “Satyam vada; Dharmam chara” (Speak the truth; follow dharma).6 Later, I reflected—shouldn’t it be “be truthful”, not just “speak the truth”?

Illustrative Texts:

• Thirukkural 292:
  “Falsehood may take the place of truth if it confers a benefit free from fault.”7
• Avvaiyar, Kondrai Vendan 90:
  “Even if you season garlic with many fragrances, its nature doesn’t change.”8

Such insights stress both pragmatism and inner integrity—be truthful, but not at the cost of compassion or conscience.

VII. Apaddharma: Ethical Flexibility in Emergencies

Perhaps the most striking tale is that of Kausika, the ascetic who always spoke the truth. When robbers asked him the direction of fleeing victims, he truthfully told them. The victims were killed—and Kausika was punished in the afterlife. Krishna uses this story to warn against rigid moralism.

“General good (lokasaṅgraha) may require the sacrifice of personal morality, narrowly conceived.” — Arvind Sharma9

Indian tradition allows for apaddharma (emergency dharma), where norms are justifiably suspended:

आपत्काले तु संप्राप्ते शौचाचारं न चिन्तयेत्।
स्वयं समुद्धरेत् पश्चात् स्वस्थो धर्मं समाचरेत्॥
(In times of crisis, don’t worry about ritual purity. Save yourself first; resume full dharma when peace returns.)10

As Adam Bowles explains:

“An apaddharma retains the transcendental goal, but allows deviation from normative codes when circumstances demand it.”11

Indian ethics is thus not lawless but layered with flexibility, responsibility, and restraint.

VIII. Rationalism vs Mysticism: A Deeper Divide

While the West emphasizes rational clarity, Indian thought leans toward mystical intuition. This divide is crucial.

The Bible says:

“Let your Yes be Yes, and your No, No.” (Matthew 5:37)

Yet, the Muktiveda (Bible) also contains examples where falsehood was morally justified:

• Abraham calling Sarah his sister (Genesis 20:2)
• Rahab hiding the spies (Joshua 2:4–6)
• Rebekah deceiving Isaac (Genesis 27)

These were not condemned, but even rewarded—because the intent was selfless, not selfish.

This suggests that Jesus’ call is not for rigid moralism, but inner moral harmony. Sadly, Western Christianity, in its drive for rationalism, has caged the Bible. Indian mystical ethics may offer a key to unlock it.

Conclusion: Toward a Mature Moral Vision

Justice, then, is not about East or West, rationalism or mysticism, idealism or pragmatism. It is about acknowledging that life is morally complex.

• From the West, we learn to seek fairness, rights, and consistency.
• From India, we learn to embrace context, conscience, and compassion.

Rather than being in opposition, worldviews may in fact complement one another—and in doing so, help us become not only more just but also more fully human.

That said, I have personal reservations about using certain illustrations to discuss questions of justice and ethics. For more on this, see: When Ethics Itself Becomes a Question: Can Some Thought Experiments Be Immoral? More on this see: https://dayanandbharati.in/when-ethics-itself-becomes-a-question-can-some-thought-experiments-be-immoral/

Notes

1 https://youtu.be/0O2Rq4HJBxw?si=3qWD5ISrFWYPG76V

2 Yudhisthira to Yaksha in Mbh Vana Parva, from Tilak, B.G. (1986 [1935]). Srimad Bhagavadgita-Rahasya. Tr. A. S. Sukthankar. Seventh ed. Poona: Tilak Brothers.

986, p. 97.

3 Chaturvedi Badrinath, Dharma, India and the World Order, Saint Andrew Press, Pahl-Rugenstein, 1993,

4 Benjamin Khan, The Concept of Dharma in Valmiki Ramayana, Delhi, Munshi Ram Manoharlal, 1965, p. 107

5 B.K. Matilal, “Krishna: In Defence of a Devious Divinity,” in Arvind Sharma (Ed.), Essays on the Mahabharata, Leider: E.S. Bill, 1991, pp. 401–418.  See also: B.K. Matilal, Collected Essays: Ethics and Epics, ed. Jonardon Ganeri, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002.

6Taittriya Upanishad, Shishkavalli, 11.1

7பொய்மையும் வாய்மை யிடத்த புரைதீர்ந்த
நன்மை பயக்கும் எனின்.-292;

ஈன்றாள் பசிகாண்பான் ஆயினுஞ் செய்யற்க
சான்றோர் பழிக்கும் வினை.–656

8 Kondrai Vendan 90: விறை ஊட்டினும் உள்ளி கமழாது

9 Arvind Sharma, Hinduism for Our Times, Delhi: Oxford India Paperbacks, 2001, p. 28.

10P. V. Kane, History of DharmasAstra, vol. I, part I, The ParAsarasmrti 7th chap last three verses—ibid. Ch. 35. The ParAsarasmrti, Fn. 499

11 Adam Bowles, “Law during Emergencies: Apaddharma,” in Patrick Olivelle & Donald R. Davis Jr. (Eds.), Hindu Law: A New History of Dharmasastra, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 245–256 (see p. 255).